Can the President Do That? Understanding Trump’s threat to freeze Harvard’s funds.
In April 2025, President Donald Trump announced a freeze of roughly $2.2–$2.3 billion in federal grants (and about $60 million in contracts) to Harvard University and its affiliated research hospitals . This step came just hours after Harvard publicly rejected a list of demands from the Trump Administration that sought sweeping changes in the university’s policies.
The White House, through a Department of Education task force on antisemitism, accused Harvard of tolerating antisemitism amid recent pro-Palestinian campus protests and insisted on measures such as eliminating diversity/equity programs, auditing faculty and students for “viewpoint diversity,” and tightening discipline on protesters. Harvard’s leadership, however, refused, with University President Alan Garber writing that “No government – regardless of which party is in power – should dictate what private universities can teach, whom they can admit and hire, and which areas of study and inquiry they can pursue” Garber argued the federal directives would “surrender [Harvard’s] independence” and violate the school’s constitutional rights. In response, the administration froze the multi-year funding, signaling an escalation in the standoff.
The political backdrop for this dispute is the Trump administration’s campaign to combat what it labels “radical left” influence and alleged antisemitism on elite campuses. Harvard became a primary target after student demonstrations, and officials framed the funding freeze as leverage to force the university’s compliance with civil rights laws. The frozen funds – about $2 billion – represent a significant portion of Harvard’s research budget, affecting major federal grants (e.g. NIH biomedical research at Harvard Medical School and its affiliated hospitals) and contracts already in progress. Harvard and groups of faculty have responded with lawsuits, arguing that the administration’s actions exceed its lawful authority, violate First Amendment and academic freedom rights, and ignore required procedures under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (the statute that prohibits recipients of federal funds from discrimination).
According to Harvard, it receives about $674 million each year in federal research funding and $1.02 bln in total research funding.
This showdown raises the question: Does a President have the legal authority to unilaterally direct or freeze congressionally appropriated federal funding to a specific institution like Harvard?
This blog post examines that question, focusing on the constitutional and statutory limits of presidential power over spending. We assess whether the Trump administration’s funding freeze is lawful – or an overreach of executive authority. Spoiler alert - it was an overreach.
[Update: Harvard sued the federal government, using many of the same arguments as in this blog post].
What Powers Does the President Have Over Federal Funding?
The Constitution provides that Congress controls federal spending, and the President’s role is to execute the spending decisions Congress enacts. See Article I, Section 9 (the Appropriations Clause) (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law” ). In other words, only Congress can authorize expenditures of federal funds. Article II, by contrast, tasks the President with the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”, which includes executing spending laws enacted by Congress. Together, these provisions establish that the President cannot spend money that Congress hasn’t approved – nor can he refuse to spend money that Congress has directed to be spent, absent legal authority to do so.
In practice, once Congress appropriates funds (for example, research grant money for universities or hospitals through NIH or other agencies), the executive branch administers those funds according to the limits and purposes set by Congress. The President, as chief executive, certaintly can influence policy priorities in how agencies award discretionary grants or negotiate contracts, but he must remain within the bounds of the appropriations laws and any conditions Congress has attached. He cannot simply cancel or reallocate funding because he disagrees with how a particular recipient (like Harvard) is operating, unless Congress has given him authority to condition or withhold those funds on certain findings.
Clinton v. City of New York: Supreme Court strikes down Line Item Veto Act, preserving “spending” for Congress
The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that the President has a general power to unilaterally amend or cancel spending mandates. In Clinton v. City of New York (1998), the Court struck down the Line Item Veto Act – a law that had allowed the President to cancel specific spending items – precisely because it gave the executive power to rewrite duly enacted laws. As Justice Stevens wrote: “There is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes.” The President must approve or veto bills in their entirety; he cannot pick and choose parts of spending laws to obey or not obey. Freezing or stopping funds that Congress has appropriated (and that have been awarded to an institution) is effectively an attempt to nullify or suspend a portion of a statute, something the Constitution does not permit the President to do unilaterally.
Further, under longstanding separation-of-powers principles, the President’s authority is at its peak when acting pursuant to an authorization from Congress, and at its nadir when acting against the expressed will of Congress. Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) set out a tripartite framework: (1) when the President acts with explicit or implicit congressional authorization, he has maximum authority; (2) when Congress has not spoken, there is a “zone of twilight” of concurrent authority; but (3) “when the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.” Here, Congress’s “will” with respect to Harvard’s funding was expressed through appropriations laws providing those research and educational funds. By attempting to freeze or withhold funds that Congress intended to be disbursed, the President would be taking action “incompatible with the expressed will of Congress” – placing himself in Youngstown Category 3, where his power is minimal and requires direct constitutional authority (which he does not have in the realm of spending).
In short, absent extenuating circumstances or express statutory authority, the President has no constitutional power to unilaterally direct or withhold federal dollars from particular institutions. His duty is to carry out Congress’s spending decisions, not to make his own.
Can the Executive Unilaterally Freeze Congressionally Appropriated Funds?
The President cannot unilaterally freeze or refuse to spend congressionally appropriated funds, except in very limited circumstances defined by law. This principle was tested in the early 1970s when President Nixon attempted to “impound” funds (withhold them instead of spending them) for programs he opposed. In response, Congress enacted the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which includes the Impoundment Control Act (ICA). The ICA was specifically designed to prevent the President from unilaterally deferring or canceling budget expenditures that Congress has mandated.
Impoundment Control Act: Further providing Congress with the Power of the Purse
Under the Impoundment Control Act, if the President wants to delay or cancel spending, he must formally notify Congress and obtain congressional approval for rescinding funds. The Act permits temporary deferrals in narrow cases – for instance, to provide for emergencies or unforeseen contingencies or where lawful obligations are less than expected – but explicitly forbids withholding funds for policy reasons without Congress’s consent . In other words, the President “cannot withhold funds to achieve policy goals” under the guise of impoundment. The ICA requires that any proposed rescission (permanent cancellation) of funds be approved by Congress within 45 legislative days, or else the executive branch must release the money for spending.
The Trump administration’s freeze on Harvard’s funds is, to put it bluntly, not “in sync” with these legal requirements. By freezing $2+ billion appropriated for Harvard’s research and programs in order to force policy changes (unrelated to any immediate technical necessity or contingency), the executive action looks like an impoundment, which is not allowed. Notably, during Trump’s first term, the nonpartisan Government Accountability Office (GAO) – which oversees compliance with the ICA – determined that the administration’s hold on military aid to Ukraine violated the ICA’s provisions. Likewise here, unilaterally pausing congressionally approved university funding to coerce Harvard’s compliance with the President’s agenda fails to comport with the ICA, absent some other clear statutory authority.
The Administrative Procedure Act: The President Cannot Act Arbitrarily and Capriciously
Beyond the ICA, such an action likely also violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which prohibits federal agencies from acting in an “arbitrary and capricious” manner or in excess of their statutory authority.
Freezing or cancelling grants that have already been awarded to Harvard would be a drastic change in agency policy that would require a legal justification. If the justification is purely political (e.g. displeasure with Harvard’s campus climate) and not grounded in the law governing those grants, a court will most likely find the action arbitrary and capricious. Simply put, withholding funding might violate the Constitution, which gives Congress the power of the purse and that virtually any harmed grant recipient (state, city, or university) would have standing to sue.
However, the executive branch does have some lawful tools to enforce conditions on federal funds, particularly to ensure compliance with civil rights requirements. For example, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin by institutions receiving federal funds. If a university like Harvard were found (after investigation) to be violating Title VI – for instance, by failing to address harassment of students based on their Jewish ethnicity/national origin – the government can ultimately terminate funding as a last resort. However, Title VI and similar statutes lay out a specific process: the agency must notify the institution of the violation, attempt to secure voluntary compliance, and only after due process (including notice to Congress) can funds be cut off. In Harvard’s case, the administration has asserted that the university is not upholding civil rights (pointing to antisemitic incidents), but Harvard disputes that and in any event has not been found in formal violation of Title VI to date. The President must follow the steps required by Title VI before funds are cut. Moreover, the demands made on Harvard went well beyond anti-discrimination measures – delving into academic governance and free expression. Using Title VI as a pretext to freeze all funds is dubious - an agency cannot retrofit a political wish list of reforms into an existing funding program.
Finally, from a constitutional standpoint, allowing the President to withhold appropriated funds effectively gives him a “pocket veto” over Congress’s budget choices – something the Founders did not grant the executive. If a President could simply decline to spend money on a whim, “that effectively defeats Congress’ single most important power”, the power of the purse, rendering Congress subordinate to the President, which is not what the Constitution commands. In short, a unilateral freeze of congressionally appropriated funds – especially to force policy changes unrelated to the specific purpose of the funds – is likely unlawful. The President has at most a ministerial discretion to ensure funds are spent lawfully, not a broad discretion to suspend spending for policy disagreements.
Relevant Case Law and Legal Precedent Is Really Bad for the Administration
History and precedent strongly support the conclusion that a President cannot lawfully seize control of appropriated funds in the way the Trump administration has attempted with Harvard’s funding.
Several key Supreme Court cases and doctrines illustrate the limits on executive power in this realm:
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) – In Youngstown, the Supreme Court struck down President Truman’s attempt to seize steel mills during the Korean War without congressional authorization. The President must have constitutional or congressional authority for his actions, especially in domestic affairs. As described, Justice Jackson’s concurrence set out the famous framework indicating that when the President acts contrary to Congress’s will, his power is at its “lowest ebb” and cannot be sustained absent exclusive constitutional powers. With respect to the Harvard funding freeze, Youngstown implies that because Congress appropriated those funds, a presidential order to withhold them is unconstitutional.
Train v. City of New York (1975) – This case involved President Nixon’s administration refusing to allocate the full amount of federal funds authorized under the Water Pollution Control Act amendments. The Supreme Court held that the administration could not frustrate the intent of Congress by allocating less funding than Congress had decided upon. The statute in question said the EPA “shall” allocate the authorized sums, and the Court ruled the agency must obey that mandate in full. Train affirmed that when Congress enacts a spending law, the President cannot “rewrite” the law by spending only part of the money.
Clinton v. City of New York (1998) – As mentioned, the Court invalidated the Line Item Veto Act, reinforcing that the President cannot cancel or suspend parts of duly enacted laws. The majority held that cancelling congressionally authorized spending amounts to an amendment of the law without bicameral passage and presentment, which the Constitution forbids. The Harvard funding freeze is essentially an exercise of an unauthorized line-item veto by the executive – selectively cancelling budgetary line items (grants to Harvard) that Congress approved. Such action is unconstitutional.
Recent “Major Questions” Cases –
In 2022’s West Virginia v. EPA, the Supreme Court invoked the major questions doctrine, ruling that agencies cannot assert highly consequential powers without a clear grant of authority from Congress. The Court said that a decision of “such magnitude and consequence” – in that case, a transformative climate policy – requires clear congressional authorization. Freezing billions in funding to a major university system (and effectively attempting to regulate university policies on speech, admissions, etc.) is undeniably a matter of economic and political significance. There is no clear statutory authorization empowering the President or any agency to impose a de facto $2 billion sanction on a university for perceived ideological failings. Under the major questions doctrine, courts would likely say that if Congress intended to grant the President the power to condition or withdraw federal research funding on such grounds, it would have spoken clearly.
Nondelegation Doctrine –
Closely related to the above, the nondelegation principle requires Congress to give an agency intelligible principles to guide any delegated power. If one argued that statutes like the federal grant laws or Title VI implicitly allow the executive to withhold funds for virtually any reason (e.g. “not upholding American values”), that is an unconstitutional delegation of the spending power. Allowing a President to cut off funding at will, without clear standards, would raise serious nondelegation concerns – essentially letting the executive make the law as to who gets federal money, undermining Article I.
It’s also worth noting practical precedent: past presidents have occasionally threatened universities over various issues, but directly yanking funds has been exceedingly rare and legally checked. For instance, when the Reagan Administration attempted to deny federal highway funds to states not raising the drinking age to 21, it relied on an act of Congress (and was upheld in South Dakota v. Dole (1987) because Congress set the condition). By contrast, no president has successfully singled out an individual private university of Harvard’s stature and unilaterally frozen congressionally approved funds.
Is the Funding Freeze Lawful? No.
Given the constitutional framework, statutory constraints, and case law precedents discussed, the Trump administration’s freeze of $2 billion in funding to Harvard is on extremely shaky legal grounds. Set forth below are a summary:
Violation of Separation of Powers:
The funding freeze usurps Congress’s power of the purse. Congress appropriated these monies for research and educational purposes at institutions like Harvard; by withholding them to pressure Harvard’s behavior, the executive is effectively making a unilateral budget reallocation, which it cannot do. Under Youngstown’s framework, this is a classic example of the President acting in contravention of Congress’s enacted policy, lacking any independent constitutional power to justify it.
No Statutory Authority; Likely ICA Violation:
The administration has not pointed to a specific statute that authorizes a blanket freeze of all Harvard-related funding. Title VI is the closest hook (alleging civil rights violations), but as noted, cutting funds under Title VI requires procedural compliance and a nexus to discrimination findings, which are absent here. Moreover, the breadth of the demands (ending DEI programs, enforcing “viewpoint diversity” audits) goes far beyond what Title VI addresses (which is race/national-origin discrimination). In the absence of clear statutory permission, the freeze likely constitutes an illegal impoundment under the Impoundment Control Act. The administration’s portrayal of the freeze as “temporary” or conditional does not cure the issue – the ICA does not allow even temporary policy-driven stoppages of spending without Congress’s consent.
Arbitrary and Capricious Agency Action (APA):
From an administrative law perspective, halting disbursement on dozens or hundreds of grant projects – many of which have nothing to do with campus speech or protests – is likely arbitrary and capricious. Agencies like NIH and the Department of Education have established grant agreements with Harvard and researchers; suddenly freezing them because of unrelated student protest issues is a punitive action outside the scope of those programs’ purposes. Courts reviewing agency actions look for a rational connection to the law’s purpose. Here, there is none: funds appropriated for, say, medical research on cancer are being frozen ostensibly to punish or correct campus political climate.
First Amendment and Constitutional Rights:
Although the focus is on separation of powers, Harvard (a private institution) has raised First Amendment concerns as well. The government cannot directly tell a private university what it can teach or who to hire; leveraging funding to do so runs into constitutional questions. The Supreme Court has held that while Congress may attach certain conditions to federal funds, those conditions cannot be so coercive as to pass a “point at which pressure turns into compulsion” (see NFIB v. Sebelius, 2012, discussing coercion in Spending Clause programs). Here, stripping 100% of a university’s research funding to dictate internal policies might be deemed unconstitutionally coercive on academic freedom grounds. At minimum, it suggests the motivation of the freeze is constitutionally suspect (targeting certain viewpoints or policies), which bolsters a court’s willingness to strike it down on broader grounds.
Major Questions and Nondelegation:
Even if one were to argue that some law implicitly gives the President power to condition funds on “upholding civil rights” or similar, the major questions doctrine would demand that Congress speak clearly before an action of this magnitude is allowed. There is no clear authorization for an executive-driven overhaul of university policies under threat of losing all federal aid. Lacking that, the safest judicial course is to say the President cannot imply such power from general laws. Similarly, the nondelegation doctrine cautions against reading any statute to grant unfettered discretion to impose sweeping conditions on funds – that would be tantamount to allowing the executive to legislate.
For all these reasons, the action is most likely unlawful. We have an executive measure that clashes with Congress’s command (Appropriations Clause issue), flouts a statute designed to rein in executive spending discretion (ICA), and is unsupported by any specific lawful authority. It attempts a de facto end-run around both Congress and the normal administrative enforcement process. This is not the way things are supposed to work.
Conclusion
The decision by former President Trump to freeze $2 billion in federal funding to Harvard University (and its affiliated hospitals) tests the limits of executive authority – and by all indications, it exceeds those limits. Both longstanding separation-of-powers doctrine and modern statutes like the Impoundment Control Act make clear that the President cannot unilaterally claw back congressionally approved funding, except in narrow circumstances that do not apply here.
The attempt to do so runs afoul of the power of the purse allocated to Congress, as well as the legal protections built into our system to prevent arbitrary executive action. Past Supreme Court rulings from Youngstown to Clinton v. NYC underscore that the President must execute the law as written – he cannot suspend funds as if wielding a line-item veto.
Dynamis is an elite litigation boutique with offices in Boston, New York and Miami. Contact Dynamis today, or Eric Rosen who wrote this blog post, to discuss your case.
