Can a State Court Hold a Federal Officer in Contempt? Inside the Legal Showdown Over a Mid-Trial Immigration Arrest in Boston
A federal immigration arrest during a Massachusetts criminal trial has triggered a (constitutional) fight. In late March 2025, ICE officer Brian Sullivan detained Wilson Martell-Lebron—a Dominican national facing state criminal charges—during a lunch break in the middle of his trial. The arrest derailed the proceeding. The judge dismissed the charges and held the ICE agent in contempt. The U.S. Attorney’s Office hit back, saying the state judge had no authority under the Supremacy Clause to punish a federal officer for doing his job. This case is now playing out in federal court.
At the heart of the dispute: When does federal immunity shield a federal agent from state court penalties? White-collar defense leader Eric Rosen explores the issue below.
The Arrest That Blew Up a Trial
What Happened in Boston (Stays in Boston)
Martell-Lebron was in the middle of a jury trial on charges tied to a false driver’s license application. During a lunch recess, ICE agents arrested him outside the courtroom under a federal immigration warrant. When court resumed, he was gone. The trial couldn’t continue. Judge Mark Summerville dismissed the case and cited ICE Officer Sullivan for contempt.
The judge called it a “premeditated and deliberate obstruction of justice.”
Reaction from the DA and Defense
Suffolk County District Attorney Kevin Hayden called ICE’s move “extraordinarily reckless.” Defense counsel described it as a “reprehensible interference” with the right to a jury trial. An internal state investigation showed that state prosecutors were aware ICE might arrest the defendant, but the judge found no intentional collusion. Still, the damage was done. The trial collapsed, and the courtroom turned into a federalism battleground.
Faced with what he viewed as a grave affront to the state’s judicial process, Judge Summerville found Officer Sullivan (and the assisting state troopers) in contempt for “obstruction of justice”. He characterized Sullivan’s actions as a “premeditated” effort to seize the defendant “and not return him to court for his trial” – an intentional violation of the defendant’s due process rights. The judge’s contempt order even prompted the DA to consider additional state criminal charges against the ICE agent. In short, Massachusetts authorities treated the incident as a serious breach of the defendant’s rights and an unlawful interference with the state’s administration of justice.
Late on April 2, 2025, however, the U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts intervened, removing the matter from state court and filing a motion in the U.S. District Court to vacate the contempt finding. The US Attorney’s position is unequivocal: the state court “lacked authority to issue [such] an unlawful and erroneous order” because the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution “immunizes federal officers from state prosecution"– including contempt proceedings – for actions taken in the course of their official duties.” The Department of Justice argues that Officer Sullivan was acting pursuant to federal law (specifically, the Immigration and Nationality Act) when he arrested Martell-Lebron, and therefore, the state court cannot punish him for that conduct. This dispute raises an important legal question: Does Supremacy Clause immunity protect the ICE agent’s mid-trial courthouse arrest, despite the disruption of the state proceeding? Below, we analyze the legal arguments in the motion to vacate and the relevant law, including the constitutional foundation of federal-officer immunity, the applicable test from In re Neagle, and the countervailing concerns about fair trial rights and federal-state relations.
Supremacy Clause Immunity: Constitutional Basis and Key Precedents
The U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause provides that the federal Constitution and laws “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). This means that when federal law conflicts with state law, federal law prevails. In 1819, the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland affirmed that under the Supremacy Clause “the states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress”. State actions that interfere with valid federal laws or functions are thus invalid. McCulloch is still good law.
One offshoot of the Supremacy Clause is the doctrine of federal officer immunity in the face of state criminal law. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), the Supreme Court held that a federal law enforcement agent could not be prosecuted under state law for actions taken while performing his federal duties. Neagle was a U.S. Marshal who shot a man threatening a Supreme Court Justice he was assigned to protect. The Court reasoned that if a federal officer “is held in the state court to answer for an act which he was authorized to do by the law of the United States, and which it was his duty to do as an officer of the United States,” and he did no more than what was “necessary and proper” to perform that duty, then the state court lacks jurisdiction to prosecute him.
This principle – often called Supremacy Clause immunity – has been recognized over time. Courts have explained that Supremacy Clause immunity determines “the extent to which states may impose civil or criminal liability on federal officials for alleged violations of state law committed in the course of their federal duties”. The basic rule is that state prosecutorial power cannot be used to “frustrate the legitimate and reasonable exercise of federal authority.” Federal officials are “ granted Supremacy Clause immunity from state prosecution for actions taken in the course of their official duties,” so long as those actions were “reasonably necessary for the performance of their duties.” . This limitation ensures that the immunity applies only to genuinely lawful and necessary conduct, not to acts of personal frolic or clear excess. As the First Circuit summarized, the immunity is broad but “limited to actions that were ‘reasonably necessary for the performance of [the officials’] duties.’”
Over the years, a number of cases have applied these principles to protect federal agents from state prosecution. For example:
In re Neagle (1890): U.S. Marshal Neagle was held immune from a state murder charge after protecting a Justice, establishing the two-prong test of federal authority and necessity.
Johnson v. Maryland (1920): A federal postal employee could not be prosecuted by a state for driving a mail truck without a state driver’s license, because his federal duties permitted him to drive without such state authorization (another early affirmation that states cannot obstruct federal duties).
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Long (6th Cir. 1988): Reiterated that a state court has no jurisdiction to punish a federal agent if (1) the agent “was performing an act which he was authorized to do by the law of the United States” and (2) the agent “did no more than what was necessary and proper for him to do” under the circumstances.
New York v. Tanella (2d Cir. 2004): A DEA agent who shot a fleeing suspect was found immune from a state homicide prosecution; the federal court noted that the Supremacy Clause is intended to ensure states do not “retard, impede, [or] burden” the execution of federal law.
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. United States (1st Cir. 2007): Puerto Rico’s attempt to investigate and prosecute federal agents for actions during an FBI raid was rebuffed. The First Circuit, mindful of the Supremacy Clause, held that Puerto Rico (like a state) could not use its laws to impede federal law enforcement operations. The court underscored that state sovereignty in criminal law is significant, but it “cannot be paramount” over the federal government when it comes to valid federal activities.
From these authorities, the modern test for Supremacy Clause immunity is well established. The federal officer must show (1) that he was performing an act authorized by federal law (within the scope of his official duties), and (2) that the manner and circumstances of his conduct were no more than what was reasonably necessary and proper to fulfill his federal duties. If these prongs are met, the officer is immune from state punishment.
The U.S. Attorney’s Motion: Applying Immunity to Officer Sullivan’s Case
In the motion to vacate the contempt order, the Justice Department argues that Officer Sullivan satisfies both elements of the Supremacy Clause immunity test.
First, they assert that Sullivan’s arrest of Martell-Lebron was authorized – indeed, compelled – by federal law. INA § 236 provides the authority for ICE to arrest and detain certain noncitizens. In particular, INA § 236(c) mandates that the Attorney General (through ICE officers) “shall take into custody any alien” who falls into certain deportable categories, such as those with specified criminal convictions. According to the motion, ICE had determined that Martell-Lebron met that criteria and had obtained a valid federal warrant for his arrest. In other words, Sullivan was carrying out a federally authorized duty: executing an immigration arrest pursuant to a federal statute.
But did Sullivan “do no more than what was necessary and proper” under the circumstances. This second prong examines the manner in which the officer carried out his duties. Courts apply an objective standard, asking whether “the agent had an objectively reasonable and well-founded basis to believe that his actions were necessary to fulfill his duties.” In other words, was there a solid nexus between the officer’s conduct and the enforcement of federal policy, and did the officer’s actions comply with federal law and reasonable practice? Importantly, this test does not require the officer to have chosen the most polite or least disruptive course – only that his chosen course was reasonably justified by his federal mission.
Officer Sullivan, the motion states, meets this standard. Because the INA mandates detention of certain deportable individuals upon their identification, and Martell-Lebron allegedly fell into that category, it follows that Sullivan had good reason to believe taking him into custody was necessary to perform his job. The motion notes there is “no reasonable dispute” that arresting Martell-Lebron “furthered federal immigration policy and complied with the INA.” in short, Sullivan was doing exactly what federal law enforcers are supposed to do when they encounter an unlawfully present person subject to mandatory detention. The fact that he carried out the arrest at a courthouse during a trial recess might be controversial, but from the federal perspective it was still in service of federal law enforcement, not some personal venture. DOJ emphasizes that the Supremacy Clause exists precisely to prevent state process or preferences from dictating how and when a federal officer can perform his duties.
To bolster the “necessary and proper” argument, the motion draws an analogy: imagine a scenario where federal agents arrest a defendant (out on bail) for committing a serious federal crime during the course of a state trial. Under the state judge’s logic, even such a justified federal arrest would result in contempt charges for obstructing the state’s trial. This, DOJ argues, would be an absurd result – and one clearly not supported by the Constitution . By this reasoning, Sullivan’s mid-trial arrest of Martell-Lebron, while inconvenient for the state proceeding, was a legitimate exercise of federal power that cannot be second-guessed by state contempt sanctions.
Fair Trial Rights vs. Federal Authority
While the Supremacy Clause immunity doctrine supports Officer Sullivan’s position legally, the story is not yet over.
The Massachusetts judge and local officials view Sullivan’s conduct as a violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. A criminal defendant generally has a fundamental right to be present at all critical stages of his trial and to due process in the proceedings. By removing Martell-Lebron from the courthouse in the middle of trial (through no fault of the defendant), ICE effectively made it impossible for the trial to continue. Judge Summerville found that Sullivan’s actions constituted an “egregious violation” of the defendant’s right to due process and a fair trial. In the judge’s eyes, this was not merely a procedural hiccup but a serious injustice – the defendant was prevented from defending himself in court. The Commonwealth’s only recourse was to dismiss the charges, meaning the truth-finding process of the jury trial was cut short.
Those siding with the Commonwealth will argue that Sullivan’s actions were not truly “necessary” at that exact moment. Could the officer have waited until the trial was over, or coordinated to make the arrest at a time that did not interfere with the court? The defendant was already present in court to face his charges; presumably he was not fleeing the jurisdiction at that moment. Rushing to arrest him – without notifying the judge or arranging a return for the final session – was an unnecessarily disruptive choice. In other words, even if the arrest itself was authorized by federal law, the timing and manner (spiriting the defendant away mid-trial) might be viewed as going beyond what was “proper” in execution. The Supremacy Clause immunity test does leave room for such an argument: if a federal agent’s actions are objectively unreasonable or excessive in light of their duty, immunity would not apply. However, this argument faces an uphill battle given that federal courts have generally been very deferential to officers’ judgments in the field, requiring a clear deviation from duty to defeat immunity.
Another counterpoint is the impact on the defendant’s rights and the broader public interest in justice. The contempt finding against Sullivan can be seen as the state court attempting to vindicate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment and due process rights. From the state’s perspective, failing to respond to such an intrusion would set a precedent that defendants (especially noncitizens) can be hauled out of ongoing trials with impunity, potentially depriving them of their constitutional rights. Massachusetts might contend that a state’s interest in administering its criminal justice system and protecting the rights of the accused is an “exclusive and very important” aspect of its sovereignty. Indeed, state courts have primary responsibility for enforcing criminal law and ensuring fair trials, and a federal action that severely disrupts those functions strikes at the heart of state authority.
Despite these concerns, the federal response is that any such grievances cannot be resolved by punishing the officer. The DOJ’s brief bluntly states that while a defendant may have a right not to be tried in absentia, there is “no right to be free from federal apprehension on federal law violations while a state-court prosecution remains pending.” In other words, nothing in the Constitution or law guarantees that a state defendant can complete his trial without interference if he is simultaneously wanted for a federal matter. The proper course, under supremacy principles, is for the state to yield to the federal arrest and then adjust its own proceedings accordingly (as Massachusetts did by dismissing the case). The remedy for the defendant is not to punish the ICE agent, but simply that he can’t be tried in his absence. This may be cold comfort to state authorities, but it reflects a constitutional judgment that federal law enforcement takes precedence. Notably, U.S. Attorney Foley’s letter to the judge was uncompromising, warning that “any attempt or threat to interfere with the lawful functions of federal government agents will not be tolerated.”
The clash here also highlights a policy dilemma: courthouse arrests of undocumented individuals can have a chilling effect on the justice system. District Attorney Hayden observed that this incident “sent ripples of fear through local communities”, causing witnesses to become reluctant to cooperate and even victims to refuse to provide information to law enforcement due to fear of ICE. When immigrants – whether defendants, witnesses, or victims – fear that courthouses are trapping grounds for ICE, they may avoid appearing at proceedings, undermining public safety and justice on the state level. State officials argue that such ICE actions “are harming our public safety goals”, not enhancing them. This policy argument doesn’t negate the legal supremacy of federal authority, but it is a countervailing concern: aggressive enforcement without coordination can inadvertently let local criminals off the hook (as happened when Martell-Lebron’s case was dropped) and erode trust in the judicial system.
Ultimately, the legal merits under Supremacy Clause immunity likely favor Officer Sullivan, but the scenario raises questions about intergovernmental comity and the balance of interests. The contempt order can be seen as Massachusetts essentially saying: “If you violate our laws and procedures, we will hold you to account.” The federal reply is: “You have no authority to second-guess how we enforce federal law.” Both perspectives have weight in their respective domains – one in state criminal justice, the other in national immigration enforcement – but when they directly conflict, the (federal) Constitution prevails.
Conclusion
The motion to vacate the contempt finding against ICE Officer Brian Sullivan forces a question: Should a state court be able to sanction a federal agent for doing his job, when doing so collides with a defendant’s state trial? The likely answer is that Supremacy Clause immunity will shield the federal officer from prosecution. The Constitution, as construed in cases from McCulloch to the present, does not permit states to “impede, burden, or control” the execution of federal laws or the actions of federal officials in carrying out their duties. Officer Sullivan’s arrest of Martell-Lebron, carried out under color of feeral immigration law, falls within this protected sphere so long as it was not manifestly beyond his authority or unnecessary.
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FAQs
Can a state court hold a federal officer in contempt?
Generally, no. If the officer was acting within the scope of lawful federal duties, the Supremacy Clause bars state sanctions.
What is Supremacy Clause immunity?
It protects federal officers from being prosecuted or punished by states for doing their federally authorized job.
Does the right to a fair trial override immigration enforcement?
Not in this case. The Constitution doesn’t guarantee freedom from federal arrest during a state trial.
Was this arrest illegal under federal law?
No. DOJ says it was fully authorized under the INA and executed pursuant to a valid immigration warrant.
Could ICE have waited to make the arrest?
Maybe—but the Supremacy Clause doesn’t require it. Timing might’ve been unwise, but it wasn’t necessarily unlawful.
