Can the FBI do that? Strategies and Defenses for Judge Dugan.
A Federal Indictment of a State-Court Judge: What’s at Stake in United States v. Dugan
The Allegations
As set forth in the criminal complaint, on April 18, 2025, Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Hannah C. Dugan presided over a routine pre-trial calendar. One case on the docket, State v. Eduardo Flores-Ruiz, however, drew federal attention from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), who held an administrative removal warrant for Flores-Ruiz, a Mexican national previously deported in 2013.
Six federal agents—two ICE officers, a Customs and Border Patrol officer, two Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, and a Drug Enforcement Administration special agent, our tax dollars at work—stationed themselves in the hallway outside Courtroom 615, planning to arrest Flores-Ruiz the moment his hearing ended. They told the courtroom deputy and agreed to wait till the hearing was over. Why six agents were needed to arrest one person at a courthouse goes unexplained.
A courthouse staffer realized ICE (and its friends) was in the court and told Judge Dugan. According to the affidavit, Judge Dugan left the bench, confronted the agents, demanded a “judicial warrant,” and ordered them to the Chief Judge’s office. When she returned, she directed Flores-Ruiz and his lawyer through the “jury-room” door—which, according to the complaint, is a restricted back exit rarely used by free defendants.
What happened next is critical for the case. “DEA Agent A,” after the Judge allegedly concealed Flores-Ruiz and obstructed the investigation, literally rode the elevator down with Flores-Ruiz and counsel, standing next to each other as the elevator descended to street level. No arrest was made in the elevator. The agent then radioed the team, trailed the pair through the lobby, and helped arrest Flores-Ruiz on the sidewalk about twenty-two minutes after first contact. It does not appear that the platoon of government agents ever lost sight of their target.
The government nonetheless arrested Judge Dugan pursuant to a two-count criminal complaint, sworn out by an FBI agent before a federal magistrate judge. The charges are:
Obstruction of an agency proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 1505.
Concealment of a person from arrest under 18 U.S.C. § 1071.
Section 1505 applies when anyone “corruptly… obstructs, or impedes” a pending proceeding before a federal agency. Courts read “corruptly” as acting with an improper purpose—usually to secure an unlawful benefit or thwart federal power.
Section 1071 criminalizes “harboring or concealing” a person “for whose arrest a warrant has been issued,” with intent to prevent discovery or arrest. The concealment must be material; trivial or momentary delays generally do not satisfy the statute.
Government Theory of the Case
Prosecutors will argue Judge Dugan - who worked in the court at issue - bamboozled a team of six federal agents. Specifically, she:
Knew of the ICE warrant (she demanded to see it).
Ordered agents away from the arrest scene and into the Chief Judge’s suite, depriving ICE of physical access.
Escorted Flores-Ruiz through non-public corridors, enabling him to exit via a less-monitored elevator and flee.
Caused a 22-minute delay—adequate, they say, to prove both “concealment” and “corrupt obstruction.”
Multiple courtroom personnel, including an ADA, a victim-witness specialist, and the deputy clerk, give corroborating accounts, bolstering the Government’s case.
The Defense Playbook
The DEA Agent A “Elevator” Ride is the “If the glove doesn’t fit, you must acquit” detail in this case.
This is the most critical paragraph in the entire complaint. Paragraph 33 states as follows:
At approximately 8:50 a.m., DEA Agent A alerted other members of the arrest team that DEA Agent A was on the elevator with Flores-Ruiz. While on the elevator, Flores-Ruiz and his attorney spoke to each other in Spanish, which DEA Agent A did not understand. They exited the elevator on one of the bottom floors of the courthouse and used the Ninth Street public entrance/exit to leave the building.
This occurred after the Judge allegedly obstructed the “proceeding” and “concealed” the arrestee. So the Government’s theory of the case is that directly after the Judge spirited an arrestee out of ICE’s grasp, a federal DEA agent got in the elevator with him and failed to arrest him. That failure to arrest led to Flores-Ruiz running down the street, with federal agents in tow. This had nothing to do with Judge Dugan.
Who should be charged here - the judge or DEA Agent A, who apparently needs a refresher course in how to arrest people. Step 1 - tell the person he’s under arrest; Step 2 - take out your handcuffs and put them around the person’s wrists; Step 3 - lock the handcuffs; Step 4 - don’t forget his Miranda rights …
This is the elephant in the room. A DEA agent was literally there with the arrestee the entire time but did nothing. The Government’s case is tough.
2. Concealment Requires Actual Hiding
The elevator ride looms large for many reasons. If a DEA agent stands shoulder-to-shoulder with the fugitive, how can anyone claim the fugitive was “concealed”? The sine qua non of a § 1071 is concealment. If the police knew the subject’s location and chose not to arrest immediately (for safety, tactical, laziness or resource reasons) that directly cuts against the Government’s case.
Expect cross-examination like:
“Agent, nothing prevented you from cuffing Mr. Flores-Ruiz inside that elevator, correct?”
A “yes” (should) settle the issue.
3. Causation and Materiality under § 1505
Obstruction requires a material hindrance. Twenty-two minutes, during which agents never lost visual contact, hung out with the fugitive in the elevator while overhearing a conversation in Spanish, and ultimately making a safe street-level arrest, invites the argument that any delay was de minimis, and could not have been material. Prosecutors will respond that any intentional interference with federal authority, however brief, suffices. The jury will decide whether the delay matters.
Obstruction also requires that any obstruction be part of “any pending proceeding.”
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States
Is an ICE arrest warrant a “pending proceeding” before a “department or agency of the United States.” There does not seem to be ancillary proceedings. This too will be critical, and it has the added benefit of being a legal issue that can be litigated before trial.
4. Intent—or Lack Thereof
“Corruptly” is the mental state prosecutors must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Judge Dugan will argue she:
followed courthouse policy to keep arrests out of courtrooms,
sought a “judicial warrant” because in Wisconsin that phrase implicates due process,
acted to protect victims, lawyers, and the public from a hallway takedown.
If jurors believe her motives were institutional—court security, orderly process, etc …—rather than personal or political, they may fail to find a “corrupt” intent.
Why This Case Matters
Federal prosecutions of sitting state judges are rare. When they occur—bribery, fraud, civil-rights violations—the conduct usually screams criminality. Here, the alleged crime is poor courtroom management in the face of federal immigration enforcement. Exhibit A for the defense is “DEA Agent A,” who apparently could not arrest someone standing right next to him.
However the case ends, United States v. Dugan will test:
where courtroom authority ends and federal supremacy begins,
how far obstruction statutes reach into inter-governmental turf fights concerning immigration, and
whether momentary logistical decisions can trigger felony liability.
For defense lawyers, and Judge Dugan, the message is clear: focus on statutory fit and intent, hammer the elevator detail, and frame every act as a judge’s good-faith effort to balance safety and justice. For prosecutors, the challenge is to show purposeful subversion, not mere courthouse friction. This might be difficult given the actions of “DEA Agent A”. This case is an important one to watch.
